CONTOURS OF KASHMIR DISPUTE---SOME EXCERPTS FROM MY BOOK

MOUNTBATTEN’S PIT!

“I don’t care what people say about me today. I will be judged at the bar of history”, so said Lord Louis Mountbatten to Khushwant Singh, who quotes him so in his book “Truth, Love & A Little Malice”. (1) Khushwant singh had met him in mid fifties, when he worked with the Indian High Commission. Mountbatten remained convinced till his death that he had done a great job in trying to resolve Kashmir tangle. But he never accepted the fact that he was the author of the script for Kashmir imbroglio.

It is an emotional tragedy so thrust upon South Asia by a dying and decaying world power of Second World War vintage, who, stung by the post world war reality of its diminishing world sphere of influence, wanted to carve out a future role for itself. By deliberately creating Kashmir–like–problems, in her lost empire, she sought to sustain its past glory and image. As its empire shrank from Asia and Africa, it left footnotes for a troubled future in its erstwhile colonies. Zaire (Congo); Zimbabwe (Rhodesia); Angola; South Africa; Nigeria and Middle–East, all have felt the stings of its such a hidden desire. But South Asia was special because it was a jewel in her crown and she had to ensure it remained firmly in her grip, if not in the crown. So, a well thought out plan was put into action to create an unending dispute over Kashmir. A deliberate wrestling arena was created for India and Pakistan to keep fighting in it till eternity. The job was given to the last viceroy of India – Mr. Mountbatten, who was not found wanting in it, as we shall look at the events in 1947 and 1948.

It is a fact of history now that the greatest loser of Second World War was not Hitler’s Germany but Churchill’s Great Britain. Someday when the history of world is re-written the Afro-Asian world will owe its gratitude to Hitter for precipitating an event which shook the roots of colonialism and heralded an era of free – world. It is the most positive aspect of Second World War, despite all the ‘negativism’ ascribed to it. With the sun–setting on the British Empire at the close of Second World War, the British colonial policy of ‘Divide and Rule’ was revitalized to create bones of contention amongst the inheritors of their old colonies. Thus in June 1947, when Britain decided to partition the sub-continent, she had resolved to create Kashmir tangle. Mountbatten, the last viceroy, and first Governor General of India, was the key player. He had begun to manipulate the events in June 1947 itself. Let us see some of his actions.

On 04 June 1947, (2) in a reply to a question in a press conference he revealed his intentions. The questioner had asked him a clarification on British paramountcy pacts/treaties with various princely states in India. The questioner had basically wanted to know the status of princely states after the sub-continent got its independence. In his reply Mountbatten had sown the seeds of dispute. The question was, “When you withdraw paramountcy, would you regard sovereignty as thereafter being vested with the princes or the people of the states” Mountbatten replied, “It is a question with whom the treaties were made”.(3) Every reader will think as to what Mountbatten had implied by “Whom” was “Princes”. No, he did not. Here, it would be necessary to clarify that Britain, in 1947, had ruled Indian Subcontinent both directly and indirectly. Large Chunk of the sub continent was directly governed by the British Monarch called British India. Besides this, there were a large number of princely states, around 562, which were indirectly governed through local princes, with whom Britain had Paramountcy agreements. Thus, when Britain decided to free British India, it had also announced that paramountcy agreement would also lapse, which meant the princes were free to choose between either of the two dominions i.e India and Pakistan or become a sovereign Independent State. This is what the questioner was trying to clarify in the said conference on 04 June 1947. In simple words, the questioner sought to know whether the people of the princely states were going to play any role in deciding about the future of the state. Mountbatten’s answer therefore conveyed that it would vary from state to state. This is distinctly apparent, also from his answer to a specific question on the fate of Kashmir and Hyderabad in the same conference. While acceding to the rights of princes to choose their options, he put a rider that a prince must take into account geographical situation and communal interests before making any decision. He was thus giving ideas to the future leaders of India and Pakistan to interpret it the way they liked it. In so doing, he was sowing the seeds of great discord. Mountbatten was a past master in the game of double –speak and he fully exploited it to widen the gulf between the moral rigidity of India and emotional inflexibility of Pakistan. He had thus begun to draw up a blue – print for the Kashmir controversy. It is in this conference, he had inaugurated the digging of his pit, which later drew India and Pakistan into it. In order to realize his aim, Mountbatten had his finger at the pulse of three main characters of the subcontinent. He knew their rigid stands. In the garb of closing the gap and finding a solution, he had only to strengthen their personal prejudices so as to reach a point of no return. He did this to his perfectionist best.

The three main characters, who became pawns in the hands of Mountbatten were, Maharaja of Kashmir- Mr. Hari singh; Jawahar Lal Nehru of the Congress and Mr Mohammed Ali Jinnah of Muslim league. Ground realities and ambivalent positions of these three characters suited and favoured Mountbatten fully. Add to this list of three, the ambivalence of Sheikh Abdulla – a Kashmiri Muslim, who had his own charter of ambitions to assist Mountbatten in his game plan.

The Maharaja nurtured a desire to declare Jammu and Kashmir a free and Independent state with himself being all in all. The Hindus of Jammu region, bulk of them, supported him. But National Conference of Sheikh Abdulla in Kashmir, though a votary of Independence status, wanted no role for the Maharaja. In any case, if it came to choose between India and Pakistan he sought to go along with secular Nehru rather than theocratic Jinnah. Majority of the Muslims of the valley in 1947 were with National Conference of Sheikh Abdulla- who was the uncrowned king of the Kashmir valley. However it would be pertinent to understand Maharaja Hari Singh’s problems at the time. In June 1947, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was a Muslim predominant state with 75% Muslim Population and 25 percent Hindus. The opinions amongst both communities were sharply contrasting and confusing. The six regions of the state voiced differently. The Mirpur – Punch belt was a votary for Pakistan. The Baltistan, Dardistan and Gilgit areas preferred independent status, failing which they sought merger with Pakistan. The Kashmir valley favoured independence with no role for Maharaja and was prepared to join either of the dominions that recognized sheikh Abdullah as the sole leader with special status to the state. At the same time, Sheikh Abdullah distrusted Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who, too, was wary of Sheikh Abdullah. The animosity between the two was so deep that Jinnah preferred to deal with Maharaja Hari Singh than Sheikh Abdullah. Gandhi-Nehru combine of congress backed up Sheikh Abdullah. They were not prepared to deal with Maharaja unless it had the backing of Sheikh Abdullah, who was not prepared to make any commitment, unless Maharaja abdicated in his favour. If at all, Maharaja Hari Singh nourished any desire to join India, in June- July 1947, it was spurned by Nehru–Gandhi idealism. (4) Though Jinnah offered special status to Maharaja through Major General SL Scott, the chief of staff of the state forces, yet Maharaja was not convinced due to his personal fears in a Muslim state. (5) Thus it seems, backed up by some Hindu supporters of Jammu, Maharaja was inclined to dream of an independent state. Legally, he was helped by the Indian Independence Act passed by the British Parliament on 12 July 1947. The act had stated that the paramountcy that the British crown had exercised over princely states would end on 15 August 1947. Therefore, princes were free to choose their course of action before 15 August 1947. If, by 15 August 1947, they had not joined either of the two dominions, the state would be deemed to be free and sovereign under its own king. This was actually the bone of contention. Most people questioned the right of sovereignty being given to princes. This was what the questioner had also asked Mountbatten on 04 June 1947. Though, Mountbatten would have known the official position of the British Government, as he had prepared the draft of the Indian Independence Act, thereby, clearly assigning the sovereignty to princes, yet the viceroy created an air of ambiguity about it. Taking this line, he advised the Maharaja to stop entertaining a desire of an independent state and decide in favour of either of the dominion, before 15 August 1947. He even assured him if he decided in favour of Pakistan, it will not be treated as an unfriendly act by India. (6) It is not understood as to why was he only giving such an advice to King of Kashmir and why not to Nizam of Hyderabad or Nawab of Junagarh or any other princely state. Mountbatten very well knew that Maharaja Hari Singh would resist any move which pushed him towards Pakistan. He also knew, bitten by idealistic fervour, Nehru-Ghandhi combine will not accept Maharaja’s request for accession unless backed by the popular movement of Sheikh Abdullah who wanted Maharaja to go at all costs, before deciding about the state’s future. In fact, Mountbatten was deliberately spewing venom into Maharaja’s mind so as to enliven the controversy. Should it happen, lying at the junction of India and Pakistan, the state of Jammu and Kashmir had all the potential of becoming a permanent bone of contention between India and Pakistan, thus ensuring an arbitrator’s role for Great Britain for all times to come. In essence, even if the jewel of South Asia slips out of the British Crown but it will remain firmly gripped in her hands. Therefore Kashmir had to become a raging controversy. Thus, Mountbatten had to scuttle any move for peace over Kashmir. In so doing, he was ably assisted by the British Officers heading Pakistani, Indian and Kashmiri armed forces. By 15 August 1947, Louis Mountbatten had created enough confusion to ensure Maharaja had become indecisive. His “will-of-people-advice” to Maharaja Hari Singh had a definite poly to reinforce personal prejudices of “The Four Principal Characters”. To Nehru, “will-of-the –people” meant the choice of Sheikh Abdullah. Sheikh Abdullah was non-committal till Maharaja handed him over the power. He thereafter wanted a special status from either of the two dominions before acceding or staying independent. Nehru was prepared to accept him but Jinnah out rightly rejected any role for Sheikh Abdullah. To Jinnah, “will-of-the-people” meant that 75 percent Muslim population of the state would automatically favour Pakistan as it was being carved out as a ‘Muslim Homeland’. To Maharaja Hari Singh, “will- of –the – people” had no meaning, as Indian Independence Act of June 1947 had merely given an option to princes to choose, before 15 August 1947, to join either India or Pakistan. Should it not happen by the said date the princely state would be an independent, free and a sovereign state with its own king as head of the state. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, a renowned barrister-at-law, had no doubts about the legality of this provision of the ‘Indian Independence Act’. He was therefore prepared to do business with Maharaja Hari Singh when he offered him special status as enjoyed by him under the suzerainty of British crown. But Maharaja was doubtful of his future in a Muslim Pakistan. The open suggestion of Mountbatten had made him more stubborn. In a bid to buy time, Maharaja offered a ‘stand-still-agreement’ to India and Pakistan. While Pakistan accepted this, India rejected it because it was not supported by Sheikh Abdullah -the Indian yardstick of “will of the people”. It is an irony that Nehru-Gandhi combine of Congress had made ‘Sheikh Abdullah of the Kashmir valley’ synonymous with whole of Jammu and Kashmir. Definitely, within the valley, he was a popular voice but not in the other regions. It had been this synonymy of Kashmir with other parts of J&K, which had always guided India’s J&K policy since 1947. This is what Mountbatten had deliberately conceived so as to prolong the dispute. His advice to Maharaja too was based on this ‘Synonymy- Principle’. He had wrongly hoped and miscalculated that protracted dispute between India and Pakistan would ensure an ‘Ombudsman’s role for Britain’ for all times to come. Unfortunately, while the conflict remains, Britain is no more at the centre stage of world affairs. But Louis Mountbatten had not anticipated this. And he continued to misguide Nehru, ill-advice Maharaja and inflame Jinnah’s emotional fury. In his this grand scheme of things, he was ably assisted by plethora of British army officers well entrenched in the British Indian army at the time of partition. The attitude and behaviour of the British officers of those days, particularly in the context of princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, is amply documented in many a books. Major General (Retired) Hira Lal Atal, in his book “Nehru’s Emissary to Kashmir” explains in Chapters One to Three of the book as to how these officers were deliberately acting against the best interests of the dominion they were serving in. (7) It is with their help Mountbatten was able to turn Kashmir into a wrestling pit for India and Pakistan. Maharaja Hari Singh, Jawahar Lal Nehru of India and Mohammed Ali Jinnah of Pakistan, unwittingly, became his willing collaborators. They were guided by their mutual distrust, short-sightedness and personal ambitions. They did not understand the nuances of a larger game being played by Mountbatten and his British cohorts in their overtly sympathetic gestures and their packaged-advice to each one individually.

His approach was three-fold. To Maharaja Hari Singh, he would advise against independent status and join either of the dominion based on the will of his people. (8) In other words, as the princely state was a Muslim majority state he wanted the Maharaja to opt for Pakistan-very well knowing the fact that the popular voice of Kashmiri Muslims Sheikh Abdullah, wanted an independent status sans Maharaja. He was killing two birds with one stone to accomplish his larger aim. By constantly advising Maharaja to decide in favour of Pakistan, he was in fact, cementing his fears and prejudices in a Muslim majority state. Thus, he was making the Maharaja indecisive. He was also by this advice, deliberately, ignoring Sheikh Abdullah. These acts of Mountbatten encouraged Jinnah to annex Gilgit with the active co-operation of British officers in the J&K state force. (9) It may be noted that Gilgit Agency till August 1947 was under the British resident, who was withdrawn following independence and a J&K state forces officer, Brigadier Ghansara Ram, was sent as governor. Within two and a half months of his arrival, there was an uprising in the state forces, stationed in Gilgit, with the help of British Officers, and the state governor was taken as prisoner. Then, when Maharaja offered a stand-still agreement to India and Pakistan in August 1947, Pakistan accepted it. But Mountbatten prevailed upon Nehru not to accept it as it was not offered by Sheikh Abdullah – the popular leader of the valley Muslims. He encouraged Nehru- Ghandhi moralistic stand to insist that sovereignty belonged to people. He thus sought to marginalize the Maharaja with his ploy to insist upon the will of the people. To Nehru it meant the supremacy of Sheikh Abdullah and to Mohammed Ali Jinnah it meant the Muslim majority status of J&K automatically opting for Pakistan which was the basis of two nation theory. Thus, Mountbatten knew Jinnah would not accept the independent state of J&K, under Sheikh Abdullah, but was prepared to give special privileges to Maharaja. Whatever intentions Maharaja had of leaning towards India were spurned by Nehru-Gandhi moralistic stance. At the same time, Maharaja was dis-inclined to accept Jinnah’s offer and temptations due to his personal fears of reduced status in a Muslim Majority state. Guided by these considerations he was keen to maintain equidistance from two new –born dominions. Accordingly he opted for stand-still agreements with the two inheritors of colonial India, when paramountcy agreement with Britain lapsed on the day of independence. In the meanwhile, people of Poonch-Rajouri areas, dominated by Punjabi Muslims, revolted against the Maharaja and opted for Pakistan. Maharaja’s state armed forces did manage to control it but it gave ideas to Pakistani leadership.

To Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Mountbatten would assure merger of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan. As far back as July 1947, Mountbatten had assured Jinnah that in the case of Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan, no objections would be raised by India. This point has been elaborately explained by Major General (Retired) Akbar Khan in his book “Raiders in Kashmir”. (10) Mountbatten remained convinced about this till his death in 1979. He painfully explains this point to John Terraine in his book on “The Life and Times of Lord Mountbatten”. (11) He told Johan Terraine that in the beginning the Indian Government had not minded as to which dominion Kashmir would accede to. According to him, things changed only after 24 October 1947 when tribal raiders invaded Kashmir. It is obvious Mountbatten had Jinnah believe that the princely state of J&K had no other choice but to join Pakistan. It was reflected in Jinnah’s confidence in this belief when a large delegation of Muslim league had gone to meet him in his Delhi house in July 1947. Brigadier Akbar Khan (later Major General) was also present there in his capacity as a member of the armed forces partition sub-committee. When the delegation expressed its concern about the Maharaja of Kashmir- a non-Muslim and Sheikh Abdullah-a Muslim leader of the valley opposed to Pakistan, who would try to avoid J&K’s accession to Pakistan, Mr. Jinnah dismissed their fears that the opinion of the two persons could not be an obstacle. (12) Echoing Mountbatten’s words on ‘will – of –the – people’ (Muslim majority of the state) and its geographic contiguity with Pakistan, he sought to assuage the sentiments of the delegation. But Mountbatten was playing his game deftly. While insisting on the will of the people, he was allowing India and Pakistan to make their own interpretations. In this scheme of things, Maharajah was dissuaded from recognizing Sheikh Abdullah who favoured independence, whom Nehru-Gandhi would recognize as the popular voice of the valley. Jinnah would do no business with Sheikh Abdullah. And Maharajah would isolate himself by maintaining equidistance from Nehru, Sheikh Abdullah and Jinnah. Thus a deliberate situation of indecision was created which forced Jinnah to put into action his plans of forcible annexation. When this happened, Mountbatten’s pit had been fully created. It became deeper and deeper as time rolled by. Mountbatten had known that Kashmir would defy all solutions. He had cleverly created the insurmountable chasm amongst the four key players. Some of his actions of the last week of October 1947 expose his game. On 24 October 1947, when Maharajah of J&K pleaded with India for help, Mountbatten advised the government against any help due to lack of full information. (13) (14) Thus, VP Menon was rushed to Srinagar on 25 October 1947, who returned the next day with an assessment to immediately send the reinforcements. When the cabinet committee on defence was considering the same, Lord Mountbatten, now intervened. He told the committee that it would not be proper to send Indian troops to Kashmir, as on 15 August 1947, it had become an independent country. He argued to say its independent status stemmed from the fact that the state had not acceded to either of the dominion, as desired in the Indian Independence Act of July 1947. He asserted that the Government of India must acquire accession document from the Maharaja before it could send her troops. In the same meeting, to make it difficult for the government to intervene or rather dissuade moralistic emotions of Nehru from intervening, he strongly voiced his opinion that the accession by Maharajah would be incomplete without ascertaining the ‘will of the people’. He recommended that the accession by Maharaja should be conditional unless supported by a plebiscite after the raiders had been driven out. Once again Government of India fell for it and sent VP Menon to Jammu to obtain accession document signed by Maharaja Hari Singh.VP Menon returned in the evening of 26 October 1947 with the document. Yet again he tried to stall Indian intervention by giving military reasons but Nehru over ruled him. The government thus took the decision on 27 October 1947, full three days after the request was made by the Maharaja on 24 October 1947. The points raised by Mountbatten could have been well conveyed in the first meeting on 25 October. It is obvious he was deliberately delaying intervention to allow raiders from Pakistan to make significant gains or even capture Srinagar airfield. He had got them three vital days which allowed them to come right upto Baramulla, some 45 Kms from Srinagar airfield. Perhaps, another day or so would have got them the final objective. And Mountbatten tried all tricks in his bag to put off the decision to intervene. As recorded by Sh VP Menon in his book, “The story of the Integration of the Indian States”: it seems after the defence committee had taken the decision to militarily intervene in Kashmir on the evening of 26 October 1947, Mr. Mountbatten, now used another tactics to prevent or delay intervention. He, now, along with three British chiefs of staffs of the Army, Air Force and Navy, chipped in with military reasons of inadvisability of the operations. All of them advised against the military intervention. Mercifully, Nehru acted firmly and told them that the only alternative to sending troops would be to allow a massacre in Srinagar which would unleash a major communal holocaust in India. (15) Thus, on the morning of 27 October 1947, Indian troops were airlifted to Srinagar when tribal invaders had over-run Baramulla and were knocking at the doors of Srinagar. But by now, Mountbatten had partly achieved his objective of creating a stalemate. He had to only now ensure that it becomes a lasting stalemate. In this, he was aided by General Gracey, the acting chief of Pakistan Army, in the absence of General Messervy – the permanent incumbent.

It seems on the night of 27 October 1947, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, had ordered Pakistan Army to attack Jammu as stated by Major General Akbar Khan (Retired) of Pakistan Army. He quotes Allan Campbell from his book “Mission with Mountbatten”. Had it happened, it would have put an end to Mountbatten’s future scheme of things. In the world public opinion, Pakistan would have become an out right aggressor. The cover of “Tribal Invasion” would have been blown off. It would have complicated Mountbatten’s plans. Therefore it seems General Gracey advised Jinnah against such an action. The versions may vary. While Allan Campbell maintained that Gracey refused to carry out Jinnah’s orders without approval of supreme commander, Field Marshal Auchenleck; Major General Akbar Khan believes Gracey was able to convince Jinnah to withdraw his orders. One would like to believe Akbar Khan, who was one of the staunchest exponents of attack on Jammu in the event of Indian military intervention. (17) Gracey would have probably talked to Mountbatten about this, who might have shuddered at the thought of his future plans going awry. Thus, on 02 November 1947, when India was engaged in an unofficial war with Pakistan, the Governor General of India rushed to Lahore. There he met Mohammed Ali Jinnah. What did he do in Lahore? Why did he go at all? It was strange for a Head of the government to visit a country when both were actively involved in a war. His main objective was to dissuade Pakistan from direct military involvement in Kashmir. A question might be asked as to why he would do that. The answer to this lay in his future plan of action at that point. He knew legally Kashmir had acceded to India as provided in the Indian Independence Act of British parliament in July 1947. Therefore, international community would see it as integral part of India. Any direct involvement of Pakistan would be seen as aggression. He had been manipulating the show to make it appear as a dispute between the two countries so as to involve United Nations Organisation (UNO). Hence, if the issue then went to UNO, it would go under charter VII of the UNO, which seeks to throw out the aggressor. This is what he never wanted. In order to articulate as a permanent dispute between India and Pakistan, he wanted its reference to UNO under charter VI of the UNO which seeks to settle the dispute. On this hinged his whole plan for a significant future role for Britain as a mediator. Fully knowing the individual positions of the two newly born states, he was convinced that there was going to be no peaceful settlement ever. His game plan was to make the international community see it as a dispute. And there was no better option than to legitimize it as a dispute under charter VI of the UN. He knew that the Indian leadership of the times, morally stung by the Gandhian philosophy of non –violence, would not understand the difference between “eviction of aggression” and “settlement of dispute”. He could argue and convince the Indian leadership: as Pakistan was not militarily involved, it could not be termed as aggressor. And eventually he managed this. But on 02 November 1947, his mission to Lahore was to stop Pakistan from attacking Jammu region. This was his sole purpose. He very well knew, then, that UNO was paper tiger; it could not resolve any dispute other than passing resolutions. Thus “Jewel in the Crown” of Britain was being sought to be firmly held in the hands of a self–appointed care-taker. However allergic the modern Indian leadership may be to the word “Dispute”; it forgets it was their predecessors in the dawn of independence, who unwittingly accorded it the sanctity by playing into the hands of Mountbatten. Let us see how?

Quoting from a book ‘Mission with Mountbatten’ by Allan Campbell Johnson, who was Mountbatten’s Military attaché in November 1947, Shri DR Goyal argues, (18) in his book “Kashmir”, that when Mountbatten had gone to Lahore on 02 Nov 1947 he had advised Mohammed Ali Jinnah on the strength of Indian troops in Kashmir and their likely build up over the next few days. He thus suggested to Jinnah that he (Mountbatten) considered the prospect of the so-called tribesmen entering Srinagar in any form was remote. It is presumed he would have also fore–warned Jinnah on his ill-advised intentions of invading Jammu region. He probably would have told him the repercussions of being branded as an aggressor state. He probably advised Jinnah to bid for plebiscite in Kashmir, as it was the best option for Pakistan at that point of time. Louis Mountbatten played the Muslim Majority card with Jinnah, very well knowing the fact that Kashmir valley Muslims would go along with Sheikh Abdullah, who preferred independence or India. When Jinnah expressed his apprehensions on this bid, Mountbatten now played his trump card of suggesting a plebiscite under UN supervision. Legal mind of Jinnah would have well understood the difference between “resolving the dispute” and “evicting the aggressor”. He therefore seemed to have agreed with Mountbatten. What ever Major General (Retired) Akhbar Khan’s sound military reason for attacking Jammu, the legal framework of international law would have termed Pakistan an aggressor? He was therefore prepared to buy Mountbatten’s argument, hoping that Muslim majority of Kashmir would go along with him, if referendum was carried out by an independent international agency.

Having thus succeeded in persuading Jinnah, Mountbatten now turned to Indian leadership. His first task was to stop the Indian offensive which was gaining momentum. Indian army was all set to throw out ‘tribal raiders’ of so–called General Tariq-Ali (Maj Gen Akbar Khan of Pakistan army). Had it happened, then, there was no dispute! He had to halt the Indian army. He thus told Nehru that the capture of ‘Uri’ was adequate to clear the valley. Beyond this, he advised a negotiated settlement of the issue. He argued that it would affect India’s moral supremacy in the international arena. He would have told Nehru that legal position was in India’s favour. And what more, Sheikh Abdullah, who was the majority leader of the valley was now with India. Therefore, the argument went: India had nothing to fear! At this stage, even Sheikh Abdullah advised against going beyond Uri. His (Sheikh Abdullah) argument was that real Kashmir was already liberated. What lay beyond Uri was Mirpur –Muzzafrabad extension of Western Punjab, dominated by Muslims, who favouored merger with Pakistan. Thus army’s offensive beyond Uri was derailed. In order to take the issue to UN, he organized the meeting of two prime ministers at Lahore and suggested to both for seeking UN role in resolving the issue. When the question came as to who would approach the UN, he manipulated Nehru to do so. He convinced Nehru that Pakistan could not be termed an aggressor, as it was not directly involved. Therefore he advised him to refer the matter under chapter VI of the UN, thus perpetuating the issue as a dispute till eternity. Mountbatten had, therefore, succeeded in creating a wrestling pit for India & Pakistan.

To sum up, it was Mountbatten and Mountbatten alone, who ensured Kashmir becomes a wrestling pit for India and Pakistan for generations to keep wrestling in it. In so doing, he had an ulterior motive to seek a future role for a dying empire so as to keep its past glory evergreen. It is a different matter it did not work out, as it was perceived by Mountbatten. But people of Kashmir are paying with their lives for his double game. What has accrued to India and Pakistan? Both got a bonanza of everlasting hostility and animosity which has seen them through three and half wars over it. They have also got the taste of an ongoing human-sacrifice-spectacle over the last 15-16 years with enormous financial costs. If the economic consequences of three and half wars and the ongoing “Bleeding war” of past 15-16 years’ are ever computed, it would turn out that both India and Pakistan each would have created a better heaven than Kashmir for themselves. Unfortunately the tragedy of South Asia has been the obsession of its people with past which make them lose sight of present reality and future viability. Thus the wrestling bout goes on and on.

But again, Mountbatten was not the cause but a mere actor, in the hands of history of Kashmir, who forced him to play a negative role. The real cause is the history of Kashmir. On the South Asian land scape, today, Kashmir has become an ‘Earthly Black Hole’, sucking into it every from of energy of the sub-continent. It is so because the current Grand Cycle will only end around year 2100 AD. In the meanwhile, it will continue to support the death dance of a dying philosophy in the valley under two pseudo–names of ‘freedom’ and ‘terrorism’. The so called ‘Jihadis of Kashmir’ are, in fact, the pawns on the chess-board laid by the history of Kashmir, purely on its own terms and conditions. Mushraff or other Pakistani Generals may call them ‘Freedom Fighters’ but they only serve the cause of the history of Kashmir. These “Merchants of Freedom” are actually its tools to desist human efforts to seek an end to a conflict between two neighbours. We will see them in the next section.