THREE BLUNDERS BY JAWAHAR LAL NEHRU-FIRST PRIME MINISTER----PART TWO
Nehru's second blunder was on TIBET. Despite, Sardar Patel and others cautioning him against China's secret designs , Nehru Continued to ignore the warnings. His four major errors of judgments as for as Tibet was concerned are:- (a) Trusting China and her Communist leadership and investing blind faith in them to acclaim world leadership. (b) Accepting CHINESE Suzeranity over Tibet, despite objections by Sardar Patel. His letter of November 07, 1950 to JL Nehru is significant in this regard and it shows Sardar Patel,s grasp of national handicaps and compulsions. (c) After accepting Tibet as part of China, not taking any action to resolve border issue with China along the McMohan line as was agreed to by erstwhile independent Government of Tibet in 1914 treaty with British India. China did NOT accept Mc Mohan line as the boundary. (d) Ordering Indian Army to Evict the Chinese from encroachments made by China in Arunachal Pradesh, without proper military preparations.
China was the 'Bad Boy' of 1950s in the Western eyes. USA and WESTERN EUROPE were breathing down her neck. Militarily and economically it was nowhere near its adversaries despite support from Soviet Union, who was still trying to rebuild herself after the destruction unleashed by Second world war. China needed a bridge to connect to West and USA to get the breathing space. Thus, Nehru and his idealistic inclinations, provided the needed bridge to China.
Nehru's INDIA was the platform which professed China's case for a permanent seat in the Security council of UNO. This despite many colleagues advising him against this. To be very frank, Nehru had his personal ambition to be fulfilled to be recognized as a world leader outside the two blocks. This he did by launching a NONALIGNMENT MOVEMENT in 1954, along withMarshal Tito of Yugoslavia and Nasser Hussain of Egypt. China saw an opportunity in this to get a foothold in the Third World. Nehru thought that china was under his obligation for this. It was a fallacy which got cleared in 1962.
Nehru's obsession with China sprang from his misplaced love for SOCIALISM and COMMUNISM---- this was the buzz word with all those who went to OXFORD or CAMBRIDGE universities in the dawn of the 20th Century. But the problem with Nehru was that he was superficial about these concepts because he had not suffered poverty . Therefore he had no first hand knowledge of people,s concern. He was far removed from ground realities. His knowledge and concern was NEVER India-Centric. His fascination for communism was because it opposed West and gave Nehru the space to create a niche for his ambition of world leadership.
A former joint secretary in the Government of Assam, Mr. Bk Bhattacharya, well versed in matters of Tibet , wrote in his article , " Nehru and Tibet", published in THE STATESMAN and reproduced in THE DARJEELING TIMES that Nehru reposed unwanted faith in Chinese leadership and discounted all fears expressed by Sardar Patel and others. He states: "------Nehru believed China. He never imagined that “Peking represented a threat to Indian interests in the foreseeable future” (p 83 of Subimal Dutt’s book). Brigadier JP Dalvi in his book, Himalayan Blunder, has written that in 1954, Nehru revealed his mind when he said: “What right does India have to keep a part of its Army in Tibet, whether Tibet is independent or part of China?” (p 22). Nehru also told Durga Das that “he would not quarrel with China over Tibet. He would not take over Curzon’s role and establish Indian influence in Lhasa” (p 295, India from Curzon to Nehru and After).
It is clear that either Nehru was too confident of his own intelligence or he had some other motive to discount Chinese threat. I reckon it was the combination of both. His statement to Durga DA's as quoted above makes it clear that he attached no importance to what Patel had been warning him. As early as November 07, 1950, Sardar Patel had written to JL Nehru on evil intentions of china. Here is an excerpt from the letter:
"---------Let us also consider the political conditions on this potentially troublesome frontier. Our northern and north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal areas in Assam. From the point of view of communication, there are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is almost an unlimited scope for infiltration. Police protection is limited to a very small number of passes. There, too, our outposts do not seem to be fully manned. The contact of these areas with us is by no means close and intimate. The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three years, we
have not been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam. European missionaries and other visitors had been in touch with them, but their influence was in no way friendly to India or Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that discontent is smouldering there. Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force: it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age. In these circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only by enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy. I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Union, would not miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in support of their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In my judgement the situation is one which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be
vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policies to attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident.----------"
Brahma Chellany, a reputed Defence and Security analyst, wrote in his article," 40 YEARS AFTER 1962 WAR WITH CHINA" in Hindustan Times on October 20, 2002, "An overconfident Nehru, who ran foreign policy as if it were personal policy, went to the extent of telling Patel by letter that it would be a "foolish adventure" for the Chinese Communists to try and gobble up Tibet, a possibility that "may not arise at all" as it was, he claimed, geographically impracticable!------".
Here it is then a proof that he overrated his own intelligence in pursuit of his personal agenda of acquiring world leadership. And thus he cared nothing for those who advised him otherwise. A man who could give a shut up call to MK GANDHI, his mentor and benefactor, on his Kashmir visit in 1946,how would he listen to Sardar Patel and others. Thus Tibet was doomed in the ambitious personal agenda of Nehru and China was brought next to Indian borders. It's Consequences we're to be seen in 1962. By then, it was too late. And Nehru later lamented, so tells Brahma Chellany:
"-----In 1962, Nehru, however, had to admit he had been living in a fool's paradise. "We were getting out of touch with reality in the modern world and we were living in an artificial atmosphere of our creation," he said in a national address after the Chinese aggression.Nehru had ignored India's military needs despite the Chinese surreptitiously occupying Indian areas on the basis of Tibet's putative historical ties with them, and setting up a land corridor to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir through Aksai Chin.
Although Indian military commanders after the 1959 border clashes and casualties began saying that they lacked adequate manpower and weapons to fend off the PLA, Nehru ordered the creation of forward posts to prevent the loss of further Indian territory without taking the required concomitant steps to beef up Indian military strength. Nehru had convinced himself that the Chinese designs were to carry out further furtive encroachments on Indian territory, not to launch major aggression.-----" Obsessed with his craze for international glory and his lopsided belief that PANCHSHEEL, signed by him and Zhou En Lai, Chinese premier , at Bandung in 1955, would insulate India against Chinese aggression. China never really entertained any notion of PANCHSHEEL. It was just to keep Nehru amused. A commentator observes:
"-----This is still not the full story. On the heels of this twin blunder — abandonment of Tibet and sponsorship of China, with nothing to show in return — Nehru deceived the Indian public in his pursuit of international glory through Pancha Sheel. Pancha Sheel, which was the principal ‘policy’ of Nehru towards China from the betrayal of Tibet to the expulsion of Dalai Lama in 1959, is generally regarded as a demonstration of good faith by Nehru that was exploited by the Chinese who ‘stabbed him in the back’. This is not quite correct, for Nehru (and Krishna Menon) knew about the Chinese incursions in Ladakh and Aksai Chin but kept it secret for years to keep the illusion of Pancha Sheel alive.
General Thimayya had brought the Chinese activities in Aksai Chin to the notice of Nehru and Krishna Menon several years before that. An English mountaineer by name Sydney Wignall was deputed by Thimayya to verify reports that the Chinese were building a road through Aksai Chin. He was captured by the Chinese but released and made his way back to India after incredible difficulties, surviving several snowstorms. Now Thimayya had proof of Chinese incursion. When the Army presented this to the Government, Menon blew up. In Nehru’s presence, he told the senior officer making the presentation that he was "lapping up CIA propaganda."
Wignall was not Thimayya’s only source. Shortly after the Chinese attack in 1962, I heard from General Thimayya that he had deputed a young officer of the Madras Sappers (MEG) to Aksai Chin to investigate reports of Chinese intrusion who brought back reports of the Chinese incursion. But the public was not told of it simply to cover up Nehru’s blunders. He was still trying to sell his Pancha Sheel and Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai to the Indian public. Even today, Nehru’s family members exercise dictatorial control over the documents pertaining to this crucial period. Even documents in the National Archives are not available to scholars without permission from the Nehru-Gandhi family heirs. This is to protect his reputation from being damaged by the truth.--------" (http://aryasamajmavdi.blogspot.com/2009/03/nehru-and-china-tibet-blunder.html)
Thus, by all accounts, Nehru had badly blundered on Tibet because of his obsession with his own greatness and craze for international glory. I won't like to go into the facts as to who started the war ? Neville Maxwel , author of 'India's China war' lays blame on India which in turn goes to Nehru. Kuldeep Nayyar, an Indian journalist of repute, blames Nehru for the 1962 war. He claims to know the inside stories of the Government of those days through his links with Govind vallabh Pant and others. This has come out in his autobiography, " Beyond The Lines", released in 2012.
In conclusion , I would sum up that Nehru blundered in surrendering the advantages of 1904 convention on the boundary between Tibet and India. Though he accepted Chinese Suzeranity over Tibet, he failed to tackle the boundary issue with his so-called Chinese friends. He induced himself to believe that Panchsheel would serve as a shield against Chinese aggression. Having done this, he continued to neglect military assessment on Aksai chin and border incursion into NEFA in the Longju area in 1959. After this military exchange in 1959, it should have been clear to him as to how weak and ill prepared his army was. But he was carried away by a self belief,reinforced by Panchsheel that China would not adopt an offensive posture against India. Thus, when he learnt of Chinese fresh incursions across McMohan Line , he ordered Indian Army to " evict the Chinese". This was his Waterloo. Mao Tse Tung decided to teach him a lesson and bring him down to mother earth and he did so. The world laughed at him and India continues to pay for this blunder.
--------------To be concluded in Part -4
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