MORALITY CRISIS: GENERALSHIP , WHAT AILS YE?

MORALITY CRISIS: WHAT AILS YE, GENERALSHIP ? 

Lieutenant General Ata Hasnain, erstwhile Military Secretary and the General officer with abundant experience of conducting counter insurgency operations in Kashmir, has authored an article , advocating as to how to go about NURTURING STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP in the military. I have been a votary of this "thought" for very long. Unfortunately, Indian army has stratified layers of thinking. Most often the views of Colonels and below, serving and retired,  are dismissed because there was a general belief that "Generals think Better than Colonels". It is absolutely untenable conclusion. Those who think so, forget the history of military warfare , more particularly the writings of Liddel Hart, the Captain who taught Generals. He was the man who pioneered the strategy of "Indirect Approach", which was brilliantly exploited by German Generals in Second World War.

       Most often the wars are NOT won by those who plan but by those who execute those plans. Even brilliant plans can fail , if poorly directed and foolishly executed. Therefore, there has to be a very close and intimate relationship amongst three types of military leadership I.e. Conceptual, Directional and Executional. At these three levels, different skills get prominence. Thus, while at Executional level, Technical Skills and tactics assume significance; at Directional level, it is minimal technical Skills but decisiveness and forward thinking play a vital role. However, at Conceptual level, it is the strategy and outlining of the philosophy of conducting the military conflict. 

       It is no gain saying the fact that to acquire conceptual skills, one has to not only understand the ongoing technological advances but also grasp the strategic environments. Besides going through the rigmarole of Executional and Directional Leadership. It is but natural that Generals do not lead attacks and assaults themselves but they ought to have experienced them to understand the implications of execution of their strategy. There can not be mismatch between the two. 

      Having said this , let me come to the key point: A very good Battalion Commander (Executional Leader) need not be a good " Directional Leader" NEED . Similarly, a good "Directional Leader" (Brigadier or Major General) can not be a good "Conceptual Leader". With this in mind, German Army of the 19 and 20th Centuries had two streams of General officers, I.e. " Staff" and "Command". Both enjoyed equal status. German General staff was reckoned as brilliant in strategic and conceptual planning. Ironically, this is where the Indian Army is suffering. At Corps, Army Command and Army HQ, you do not need super -brat hunters of battle field. You need men with cool head, who can move two steps ahead of the adversary. 

Strategy is a battle of wits and not of foolish courage. You need Generals at top, who can foresee   Kargil-99 type situation brewing up and plug the loops. We need military leaders, who can avert the crisis, before the clouds rise. Reverse of this is happening in Indian Army. It is promoting Colonels and Brigadiers to be Generals, who fought "Yesterday's conflicts" well but have no potential to grasp and understand compulsions of "Today's military Complexities". They may be very good executors of plans but they might lack the very penchant to work out very good strategy. Some years back, Indian Army, introduced "Staff stream", but it was treated as something inferior to "Command Stream". It still exists but the tag of inferiority stays and thus its inefficiency and poor efficacy. Most of them seem to square pegs in round holes. 

Most often, today, higher ranks are swarmed by people who sequentially move up the ladder because of their performance as executional leaders but not based on their potential to be Directional and Conceptual leaders. Slogging or "Networked - relations" play a prominent part in their upward movement. Convoluted ACR system helped them to get into the slots. Most of them had no penchant for reading strategic environments and understanding of international developments. They proudly talk of their experiences under their "Godfathers". 

Talking about experience, I am reminded of Iron Man of Prussia, Fredrick The Great, who united Germany in the 19th Century. He was asked about the significance of Experience in Military leadership. He thought for a while and replied, "Role of experience is relative. If experience was everything, then Prince Eugene Mule should be a Field Marshal , for it has been in the Army for 35 years". Therefore is a need to go for deep selection once it comes to Directional and Conceptual leadership. Let NO MULE become a General.

Today's wars are "Smart" and "Designer"wars. Smart and Designer wars will be characterized by technological advances of the time and rapidly changing international and national environments. They need excellent conceptual thinkers who can peep into the future and work out an apt strategy. You do not need Generals who can fight well " Yesterday's War". 

I am shocked when I see Generals commenting that Indian Army must not be used for Internal security tasks. They do not understand the new philosophy of forms of war. The weight has shifted from " Absolute Wars " to WOM (Wars By Other Means) or I would say "Outsourced WaRs" by "Irregular Soldiers", be it "Maoists" or "Taliban". Nuances of this kind of war must be understood by Indian Generalship. They must forget the days of Bangla Desh type of war. This kind of luxury is available only to Super Powers. India does not enjoy this luxury. The threat to Indian nationhood is more from internal implosion than nukes from Chugai Hills or Beijing.  Which other wars these generals want Indian Army to be prepared to fight if India explodes through "OutsourcedWar" being fought by Maoists or Kashmiri Militants. 

Therefore, there is a clear mismatch of the vision of Indian Generalship and emerging Forms of War. If during Kargil-99 or Parliament -2001 or even Mumbai 26/11, you could not cross border, what other provocation will make you do so. The same compulsions would stop you. It is time to promote those officers to higher ranks who have flexible outlook towards emerging nature of military conflicts. Chinese sponsored Maoists insurgency is a greater threat to India than any external threat. At best, external enemies will exploit this vulnerability. It is time to nip the evil in the bud. And Nation must apply its best equipped and trained force to tackle it. Sack the Generals who think it is NOT the job of the Army. 

I, sometimes, feel that Generals of Indian army are out of sync with the modern military environments in which they have to function. If it has an iota of truth, then, bulk of the present Indian Generalship was unequal and unsuitable to the envisioned task they are required to perform. Most of them lack the basic attribute of a Military General, which manifests itself as unquestioned and unprecedented trust reposed in them by their subordinates. If there are exceptions to this, it confirms the existence of this malice. 

Trust deficit is the major undoing of Indian Generalship. Before I go any further, let me quote a message , floating in the social media, on the Indian Generalship. It is on the issue of NFU, ( Non Functional Up -Gradation). The message claims that there was s proposal for implementing NFU for all military officers also.It explains that the grade pay of junior officers would become 8700 in 13 years ; 8900 in 16 years and 10000 in 20 years of service,  irrespective of the rank. The message amplifies that the provision already exists in all India services and group A services. It elaborates that there was an AFT order to implement this. Here comes the punch line : "But our General Saabs feel that if a written off Lt Col gets Rs10000 as grade pay and stays at same hotel as they do ,then their 'hard work' put in to become Generals will be of no use. So our own men on top are stonewalling this implementation." 

Such an impression of Indian Generals/ Air Marshals and Admirals put them in a very poor light. It completes the trust deficit and make them unfit to wear the badges of Generals/ Admirals/ Air Marshals. The concluding part of the message is really horrifying. Are we expecting an undercurrent of a Tsunami of a rebellion building? I quote:-

"---------It's time the Generals and Air Marshals and Admirals become accountable to the men under them. It is very easy for the babus to influence decisions as only one man need to be influenced on top to accept less pay package for entire army. Please pass it on to all Faujis. It's high time the autocratic way of generals are mended-------"

This kind of message might be seen as mutinous but one must ask as to why such a condition has arisen that subordinates have this perception of their Generals. It is not first time that such messages have been flashed in the social media. A few months back a message condemning Indian Generalship in Kashmir had gone viral on the social media. It owed itself to the gunning down of some youths due to mistaken identity and the perceived "gag order", which assumed that militants killed sentries at an army post, at point blank range, because they were forbidden to fire at approaching militants without identifying them. The message had caustically hinted that Indian Generals think terrorists roam with head bands. Besides, it also brought out that genuine mistakes would occur when you play with fire and " Generals " must have the gumption to accept these mistakes rather than looking for 'scape goats'. 

The question which should beg every concerned military person's mind is why was there such a perception about Generals of the army?  What has drastically gone wrong over the years? On the time curve of Independent India where does the needle stop ? I think the answer lay somewhere midway between the years BANGLA DESH war of 1971 and Kargil-1999. The downslide of values and ethos started as a trickle in 1971 and became a deluge by Kargil - 1999. And today, it is almost a Tsunami of degraded values. Am I overly critical? No, I am not? I am only looking at the mirror which shows us our ugly face.  

Instead of hounding for those who blow the whistle or initiate such messages , as highlighted above, it is time to think about the trust deficit that exists in the higher and junior ranks. First step to do is to accept that it was really there and the fact must not be dismissed as an alarmist's hissing sound. Let us examine its causes. Don't dive far into time machine. Here are a few notable examples, which must tell one that in the days of social media revolution , these lapses get magnified and subordinates get disoriented and lose faith in the higher echelons of army.

Tell me, when a retiring Chief of the Army Staff ( COAS) , manages to become a low medical category ( LMC) for impaired hearing , just a fortnight before his retirement , what message it sends to environments ? I am sure , he did not damage his ears while sitting in the soundless air conditioned office of the COAS. Further, when media goes viral with the names of 106 very very senior Defence officers, Brigadiers and Generals, including two COAS and one Naval Chief, in the Mumbai's Adarsh Society Scam, what confidence it enthuses amongst the lower ranks. When Generals and Brigadiers are caught selling CSD liquor, what moral rights they have got to punish a Major or a Lt Col, who sell petrol/ coal dust/ or surplus men's rations? Simple , you scratch my back and I scratch your and let us live happily. And sir, these are the guys, in whom the old Generals invest and they become the rising stars of the future. Misdirected emphasis on ACRs in promotions has pushed the wrong men up, first as a trickle, then, as a flood. 

"Teheleka Expose" was just a tip of the iceberg, menace is now wide spread. I have only given some landmark episodes. They are multiplying because, as good soldiers, we tend to sweep these incidents below the carpets. And Generals, who made an open offer to his COAS of Rs 14 Crores, roam freely. What impressions do subordinates get, when media flashes this kind of news? Gone are the days of dumb and dud soldiers of " Light Brigade" , who marched into the "valley of Death". They see and hear; they reason it out and they react. And the messages on top I had discussed are the products of this reaction. 

In the days of Social media explosion, information can not be controlled. It does tumble out. And once it does, many a reputations are slaughtered. The author of HOW, Dov Seidman, says : "It has been said that information is like a toddler. It goes everywhere, gets into everything , and you can not always control it. " He bats for total transparency in the acts of higher leadership. This is a warning to the votary of sweeping such incidents under the carpet. 

But things were always not like this. In fact , Generals in olden days, displayed morals of very high standards. Writing in The Tribune, Chandigarh Daily,in his article, "When Generals were warm and friendly", on April 17,2015, a veteran Brig SS Virdi, says , "------Things were quite different when (in fifties and sixties) the officer fraternity was considered as one bereft of so much rank consciousness like ‘General's Forum/ Club’ today, as if they are a different breed. "Manu" seems to be slowly making incipient inroads into our psyche once again.----------"

Here, we are, then. The principal reason of "trust deficit" is a false assumption by today's Generalship that subordinates won't know which they already know. Dov Seidman further explains that an "information society" also breeds " Surveillance Society". In other word, people are more curious and they look for more. This is also true of soldiers and military profession. 

To nurture the Strategic leadership, army has to first ensure that moral degradation of Generalship is arrested. Only then we can rebuild the trust deficit and bring in transparency in the functioning of the higher echelons of military leadership. You can not do it by chalking out a "Succession Plans" for the COAS or others. Such a strategy is aimed at placing pliable men in chosen appointments to indulge in unethical practices. It stinks of the moral bankruptcy of the army. My statements might hurt some old guard , who think nothing is wrong. Well! They are arrested in the time capsule of their period. Alas! Generalship of today does not exudes confidence. 

And Lt General Ata Hasnain has very rightly emphasized the need for nurturing strategic leadership because strategic and international environments demand this. One is thankful to the almighty that his breed still exists and we might not be so awfully bad after all and some cosmetic efforts might turn the tables. I hope so. And I end with a quote from T S Elliot : "Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost in information? "