PATHANKOT EPISODE: GROSSLY MISHANDLED ANTI- TERRORIST OPERATION.
When 26/11 happened, it was not only intelligence failure but also an utterly mishandled affair. But in the case of PATHANKOT 01/01, intelligence was there , yet it was totally badly conducted operation. In the case of Mumbai 26/11, it took over 60 hours to neutralize 10 militants including one captured alive. In case of Pathankot 01/01, timely and accurate information was there , yet it took around 60 hours to neutralize five militants. What a way to handle anti- terrorist operation? It shows something is amiss and Indian leadership and security advisors still have no idea as to how to handle WOM (War by Other Means).
The goof ups in Mumbai 26/11 were that instead of using an Infantry Battalion, just 40 minutes driving distance from the scene of terrorist strike, 48 hours were wasted in waiting for the NSG commandos. Unfortunately, political leadership, overly influenced by bureaucrats, do not realize that Infantry battalions are capable of handling such operations with more ease and comfort.
Add to it the bureaucratic NSAs who do not want to give a chance to army to hog the glory of conducting such an operation with ease. They do not know that almost all infantry battalions and their young officers are trained in counter insurgency. If they know, they deliberately ignore. And if they do not know this , it is a shame. What good is a NSA, if he has no idea of his immediately available assets. Such a partisan conduct of the NSA , costs the nation very dearly.
Another major flaw of Mumbai26/11 was that media was allowed to give a running commentary as if it were an Indo- Pak cricket match going on. Nothing strange to know as to how our media helps terrorist handlers in Pakistan to guide and direct the terrorists holed up. Indian media and its political leadership, of all hues and cry, have no idea of the dimensions of National Security. Media is more interested in hiking its TRP ratings by broadcasting live and political leadership is more interested in "one upmanship" over their rivals. Their spicy statements against each other, not only distract soldiers engaged in operations but they also undermine their morale.
Now look at the way Pathankot episode has been handled. A senior Punjab Police officer is abducted and released by the militants. He cries hoarse of likely terrorist attack for 14 hours but no action is taken by the authorities. NSA was only interested in sending the NSG commandos. Punjab police did not share this information with their local military commanders, nor did the NSA. Intelligence was not shared at all, when it was known that Air Force Base was the militant target. Immediately, local Army units should have been deployed and Pathankot Sub Area HQ be made the epicenter of control and coordination. It was not done.
Pathankot has two infantry Brigades and an armoured Brigade. Local Sub Area HQ had no clue as to what was happening. We must know that army formations in peace locations have Counter Terrorism/ Insurgency grid established and units tasked to carry out counter operations. Sub Area HQs are tasked to liaise with civilian counterparts and adopt proper measures to handle such situations. Civil - Military liaison conferences are held for this purpose only. It seems they are only for " Tea and Samoshas".
Even when the army was called in after 14 hours of delayed information, the situation was NOT handed over to army. Air Force wanted to show its own mettle by employing it's so called " Garud Commandos". There was total lack of coordination between Army, Airforce, Punjab Police and NSG. Everyone was on its own. If the information from the abducted SP was properly and timely used, immediate action was to warn the DSC guards at the airbase and an infantry unit despatched to beef up the DSC guards. Terrorists should have been flushed out immediately. It seemed DSC guards had NO idea of impending terrorist attack and they were happily cooking their breakfast.
It is NOT understood why NSG was involved in this operation. Local Army units has their own Bomb disposal units, who could have handled the situation more easily than the elite NSG Commandos. Why NSG commander was made in charge of the operation while the local units were made to look as spectators. This government is investing too much in its NSA, who, might be good in conducting intelligence operation but is not capable of handling of physical operations involving troops. It is high time political leadership invest in a CDS, who be given the charge of Internal and external security and all such resources placed at his command. Let NSA deal with covert and strategic operations outside the country.
Again , Media was allowed to make whatever statements they could make. A total mess was created by making contradictory statements and allegations. On the spot interviews were carried out when the operations were still on. It is avoidable. It influences and adulterate the minds of decision makers. It was due to such misleading feed backs that Home Minister, Sh Raj Nath Singh made an announcement on the successful conclusion of the operation on the first day itself , while it lingered on for three days more. Media has to be kept at bay for such operations. Compare this with Pakistan Army 's handling of Peshawar incident in December 2014. Media was not only disallowed to come anywhere near the site of operation but it was also NOT allowed to make comments till the military operation was over. Indian media suffers from overdose of freedom of expression.
In conclusion , I would say, Pathankot incident suffered from lack of coordination ; failure to timely exploit actionable intelligence, over dependence on specialized forces such as NSG and Garuds; Airforce authorities not warning DSC guards and failing to beef them up with so called "Garuds" and not handing over the situation to a local military commander. Instead, it seems the operation was being handled by NSA , sitting in Delhi. What is worse , while everyone else was making statements, the defence Minister of India was kept out of the loop. He should have been first one on board. It is such obnoxious actions, which certify that Pathankot operation was grossly mishandled, even worst than Mumbai 26/11.
Finally, I feel Terrorists goofed up their well planned operation by not killing the SP, his cook and Jeweller. Whatever was the reason, it was their Himalyan blunder and they gave adequate time for "Snail-pace -moving Counter- Terrorism -apparatus" of India to retrieve the situation, though in a very clumsy manner. In , all said and done, Terrorists saved the day for India, for the flimsy way this operation was handled. Mystery remains as to why terrorists, on a suicide Mission, had allowed the SP to get away live. Was it because of a smuggler friend amongst the terrorists, who saved their lives? If so, where is the Smuggler Friend? Is he the Sixth Terrorist, who has disappeared like the lost Continent of Atlantis? Your guess is as good as mine. Even if he is the prized catch with NSG and its NSA, I would give 2 out 10 'for the whole operation. In terms of real output vis-a-vis the inputs, I reckon it was a miserable failure.
Well! I have said, what I Wanted to say. Go, have your potshots, too.
When 26/11 happened, it was not only intelligence failure but also an utterly mishandled affair. But in the case of PATHANKOT 01/01, intelligence was there , yet it was totally badly conducted operation. In the case of Mumbai 26/11, it took over 60 hours to neutralize 10 militants including one captured alive. In case of Pathankot 01/01, timely and accurate information was there , yet it took around 60 hours to neutralize five militants. What a way to handle anti- terrorist operation? It shows something is amiss and Indian leadership and security advisors still have no idea as to how to handle WOM (War by Other Means).
The goof ups in Mumbai 26/11 were that instead of using an Infantry Battalion, just 40 minutes driving distance from the scene of terrorist strike, 48 hours were wasted in waiting for the NSG commandos. Unfortunately, political leadership, overly influenced by bureaucrats, do not realize that Infantry battalions are capable of handling such operations with more ease and comfort.
Add to it the bureaucratic NSAs who do not want to give a chance to army to hog the glory of conducting such an operation with ease. They do not know that almost all infantry battalions and their young officers are trained in counter insurgency. If they know, they deliberately ignore. And if they do not know this , it is a shame. What good is a NSA, if he has no idea of his immediately available assets. Such a partisan conduct of the NSA , costs the nation very dearly.
Another major flaw of Mumbai26/11 was that media was allowed to give a running commentary as if it were an Indo- Pak cricket match going on. Nothing strange to know as to how our media helps terrorist handlers in Pakistan to guide and direct the terrorists holed up. Indian media and its political leadership, of all hues and cry, have no idea of the dimensions of National Security. Media is more interested in hiking its TRP ratings by broadcasting live and political leadership is more interested in "one upmanship" over their rivals. Their spicy statements against each other, not only distract soldiers engaged in operations but they also undermine their morale.
Now look at the way Pathankot episode has been handled. A senior Punjab Police officer is abducted and released by the militants. He cries hoarse of likely terrorist attack for 14 hours but no action is taken by the authorities. NSA was only interested in sending the NSG commandos. Punjab police did not share this information with their local military commanders, nor did the NSA. Intelligence was not shared at all, when it was known that Air Force Base was the militant target. Immediately, local Army units should have been deployed and Pathankot Sub Area HQ be made the epicenter of control and coordination. It was not done.
Pathankot has two infantry Brigades and an armoured Brigade. Local Sub Area HQ had no clue as to what was happening. We must know that army formations in peace locations have Counter Terrorism/ Insurgency grid established and units tasked to carry out counter operations. Sub Area HQs are tasked to liaise with civilian counterparts and adopt proper measures to handle such situations. Civil - Military liaison conferences are held for this purpose only. It seems they are only for " Tea and Samoshas".
Even when the army was called in after 14 hours of delayed information, the situation was NOT handed over to army. Air Force wanted to show its own mettle by employing it's so called " Garud Commandos". There was total lack of coordination between Army, Airforce, Punjab Police and NSG. Everyone was on its own. If the information from the abducted SP was properly and timely used, immediate action was to warn the DSC guards at the airbase and an infantry unit despatched to beef up the DSC guards. Terrorists should have been flushed out immediately. It seemed DSC guards had NO idea of impending terrorist attack and they were happily cooking their breakfast.
It is NOT understood why NSG was involved in this operation. Local Army units has their own Bomb disposal units, who could have handled the situation more easily than the elite NSG Commandos. Why NSG commander was made in charge of the operation while the local units were made to look as spectators. This government is investing too much in its NSA, who, might be good in conducting intelligence operation but is not capable of handling of physical operations involving troops. It is high time political leadership invest in a CDS, who be given the charge of Internal and external security and all such resources placed at his command. Let NSA deal with covert and strategic operations outside the country.
Again , Media was allowed to make whatever statements they could make. A total mess was created by making contradictory statements and allegations. On the spot interviews were carried out when the operations were still on. It is avoidable. It influences and adulterate the minds of decision makers. It was due to such misleading feed backs that Home Minister, Sh Raj Nath Singh made an announcement on the successful conclusion of the operation on the first day itself , while it lingered on for three days more. Media has to be kept at bay for such operations. Compare this with Pakistan Army 's handling of Peshawar incident in December 2014. Media was not only disallowed to come anywhere near the site of operation but it was also NOT allowed to make comments till the military operation was over. Indian media suffers from overdose of freedom of expression.
In conclusion , I would say, Pathankot incident suffered from lack of coordination ; failure to timely exploit actionable intelligence, over dependence on specialized forces such as NSG and Garuds; Airforce authorities not warning DSC guards and failing to beef them up with so called "Garuds" and not handing over the situation to a local military commander. Instead, it seems the operation was being handled by NSA , sitting in Delhi. What is worse , while everyone else was making statements, the defence Minister of India was kept out of the loop. He should have been first one on board. It is such obnoxious actions, which certify that Pathankot operation was grossly mishandled, even worst than Mumbai 26/11.
Finally, I feel Terrorists goofed up their well planned operation by not killing the SP, his cook and Jeweller. Whatever was the reason, it was their Himalyan blunder and they gave adequate time for "Snail-pace -moving Counter- Terrorism -apparatus" of India to retrieve the situation, though in a very clumsy manner. In , all said and done, Terrorists saved the day for India, for the flimsy way this operation was handled. Mystery remains as to why terrorists, on a suicide Mission, had allowed the SP to get away live. Was it because of a smuggler friend amongst the terrorists, who saved their lives? If so, where is the Smuggler Friend? Is he the Sixth Terrorist, who has disappeared like the lost Continent of Atlantis? Your guess is as good as mine. Even if he is the prized catch with NSG and its NSA, I would give 2 out 10 'for the whole operation. In terms of real output vis-a-vis the inputs, I reckon it was a miserable failure.
Well! I have said, what I Wanted to say. Go, have your potshots, too.
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